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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the population grows, so does the conflict between the demand for 
agricultural productivity and the need to maintain healthy ecosystems. 
Unfortunately, this concern alone does not motivate the agricultural industry to 
operate in a more environmentally friendly manner, nor is it an industry that has 
proven amenable to strict regulation.1 Indeed, any such effort must face one of 
the mightiest lobbies of all time.2 As it functions today, agriculture is 
unsustainable and at risk of wiping out more than its fair share of our already 
 
 Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University. The author is grateful for early-
brainstorming feedback provided by J. B. Ruhl and Dan Rohlf, as well as for the helpful practical insights 
provided by fellow symposium participants. Thanks also go to Professor Rachael Salcido for her generous 
invitation to participate in this symposium. 
1. See generally Elizabeth M. Stapleton, Agriculture as Industry: The Failure of Environmental and 
Agricultural Policy to Adapt to the Modern Agricultural Landscape, 7 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 321 (2014) 
(discussing the development of the agricultural industry into a relatively unregulated sector). 
2. See Lauren Etter & Greg Hitt, Farm Lobby Beats Back Assault on Subsidies, WALL  ST. J., Mar. 27, 
2008, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120657645419967077 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(discussing the strength of the farm lobby in defending  farm bill subsidies). 
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dwindling biodiversity. As demand for agricultural production increases, so do 
the ecological risks. One might think that the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
could solve the problem, given that it has strict prohibitions on harming listed 
species,3 but the ESA is no match for this industry, which works hard to avoid its 
reach.4 Some ESA approaches work better than others, such as regional habitat 
conservation plans that allow farmers to destroy some habitat in exchange for 
contributing to the protection of large and interconnected areas of habitat.5 
However, a review of the ESA’s implementation in the agricultural context 
makes it clear that far more is needed.6 
In recent decades, a variety of approaches to improving conservation efforts 
on agricultural land have cropped up, such as conservation easements,7 payment 
for ecosystem services (PES) programs,8 the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP) to avoid overuse of agricultural land,9 organic labeling restrictions,10 and 
direct subsidy methods, such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program 
(EQIP) and Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), which pay farmers to 
incorporate more environmentally friendly practices.11 Part II of this Article will 
review these existing efforts. 
Some of these methods, such as PES and conservation easements, tend to be 
implemented by a wide range of entities, both public and private. What we wind 
up with is a mix of efforts that sometimes overlap in a haphazard manner. The 
disaggregation of agricultural conservation efforts, which is necessitated by the 
industry’s successful avoidance of traditional top-down command-and-control 
regulation,12 is not necessarily a problem.13 However, in light of these 
 
3. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012).  Under the ESA, it is unlawful to “take” any listed 
species. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B).  An unlawful taking includes any conduct which would “harm” a listed species.  
Id. § 1532(19).  “Harm” includes “an act which actually kills or injures wildlife . . . includ[ing] significant 
habitat modification or degradation . . . .”. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2014). 
4. See, e.g., Kalyani Robbins, Lesser Conservation: The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service Proposes 
Threatened Listing for the Lesser Prairie-Chicken, Then Guts It with Special 4(d) Rule, TRENDS, Nov. 2013 
(describing just one broad section 4(d) exception to the take prohibition for agricultural activity). 
5. See infra Part II.C for a discussion of regional habitat conservation plans. 
6. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 4. 
7. See infra Part II.B. 
8. See infra Part II.A. 
9. See Conservation Reserve Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, http://www.fsa. 
usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=home&subject=copr&topic=crp (last visited Aug. 4, 2014) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
10 Organic Labeling, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. MARKETING SERV., http://www.ams.usda.gov/ 
AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateA&navID=OrgLabelingLinkNOPOrganicSeal&right
Nav1=OrgLabelingLinkNOPOrganicSeal&topNav=&leftNav=NationalOrganicProgram&page=NOPOrganicLa
beling&resultType=&acct=nopgeninfo (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
11. See infra Part II.D. 
12. See Stapleton, supra note 1, at 325. 
13. This is not to say that the regulation avoidance is not itself a problem, but it is too intractable a 
problem to focus on here. 
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disaggregated and sometimes overlapping spheres of influence, some effort at 
integration could reduce the chaos and lead to more consistency nationwide. 
Drawing from scholarship focused on transnational regimes, we see that 
decentralized (and public-private mixed) governance can be effective and even 
coordinated.14 As beneficial programs expand, social norms develop and begin to 
tie them together.15 As this occurs, it creates the opportunity to better coordinate 
and integrate the diverse influences.16 Part III of this Article explains why 
integrated multimodal governance is the most appropriate approach to governing 
ecological conservation on agricultural land, especially in light of the political 
obstacles to comprehensive regulation. 
Given the importance of scale in maximizing the benefit-to-cost ratio when 
protecting ecosystems,17 coordination of the various sources of authority is 
especially valuable in this context. It would thus be worthwhile to have an entity 
capable of taking a holistic ecosystem approach to implementing the array of 
existing programs. It is likewise important to share both information and strategy, 
in light of the shared goals of the many entities involved in the governance of 
ecologically sustainable agriculture. Part IV of this Article considers potential 
methods for improving the integration of the array of approaches, as well as the 
importance of taking an adaptive management approach to this coordination-
seeking venture. 
II. EXISTING EFFORTS TO LESSEN THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF 
AGRICULTURE 
Although there is no comprehensive legislation requiring environmental 
conservation on agricultural land,18 there are numerous programs designed to 
reach this result. Because the agricultural lobby is so immensely powerful, these 
programs tend to be very expensive, as they are entirely voluntary on the part of 
farmers and thus must benefit them economically.19 In addition to being costly, 
they are also generally uncoordinated with each other. This, when combined with 
 
14. See generally James N. Rosenau, Governing the Ungovernable: The Challenge of a Global 
Disaggregation of Authority, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 88  (2007) (predicting a system of global governance 
based upon norms, informal rules, and regimes as the world is divided into further spheres of influence and 
superpowers lose their influence). 
15. Id.at 93–94. 
16. Id. 
17. See Daniel N. Laven et al., Examining Conservation Practice at the Landscape Scale, 22 GEORGE 
WRIGHT F. 5, 5 (2005) (describing the importance of using a landscape-scale approach to conservation). 
18. See generally Stapleton, supra note 1 (discussing the development of the agricultural industry into a 
relatively unregulated sector). 
19. See J.B. Ruhl, Agriculture and Ecosystem Services: Strategies for State and Local Governments, 17 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 424, 441–42 (2008) (listing expense among the drawbacks of many of the agricultural 
conservation programs). 
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the farmer initiative for opting in,20 results in somewhat random geographic 
placement of conservation efforts. This Part provides a brief overview of the 
most common approaches. 
A. Payment for Ecosystem Services 
One of the newest and (in this author’s view) most promising approaches to 
conservation on agricultural land is Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES). 
Ecosystem services have finally begun to receive their due, at least in terms of 
scientific appreciation of value, especially since an impressive study that brought 
together approximately 1,300 experts from around the globe, culminating in the 
2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (“MEA report”).21 The MEA report 
divided ecosystem services into four categories based upon the functions they 
serve: provisioning services (e.g., food or medicine), regulating services (e.g., 
pollination or regulation of air or water quality), cultural services (e.g., 
recreational or educational), and supporting services (e.g., habitat provision or 
oxygenation).22 It has been estimated that the economic value of these services 
reaches an annual average of $33 trillion, which is 1.8 times the gross national 
product of the entire earth.23 Unfortunately, the MEA report also concluded that 
roughly 60% of ecosystem services had already been degraded by human activity 
and that further decline was rapidly underway.24 Conversion to agricultural use is 
a leading cause of this destruction.25 
Because of the immense economic value of ecosystem services,26 combined 
with the urgency of preserving what is left of them,27 some governments have 
deemed it worthwhile to begin purchasing them from landowners as one would 
 
20. Before those with practical experience lose all faith in this Article’s proposal, it will not involve a 
loss of this farmer discretion (the author is aware of how unpalatable this would be). Indeed, by determining the 
relative value to various programs of each farmers’ land, it may even be possible to increase some farmers’ 
negotiating power. 
21. CARLOS CORVALAN ET AL., WORLD HEALTH ORG., ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: 
HEALTH SYNTHESIS, A REPORT OF THE MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, at ii (José Sarukhán et al. eds., 
2005) [hereinafter MEA REPORT]. 
22. Id. at 12. 
23. Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 
NATURE 253, 259 (1997). 
24. MEA REPORT, supra note 21, at 6–8. 
25. Id. at 6. 
26. See generally James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887 (1997) (the 
seminal law review article on this topic). 
27. See Gro Harlem Brundtland, Op-Ed., Earth Agonistes, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2012, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2012/06/19/opinion/earth-agonistes.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“With our 
current growth and development model we are indeed changing the earth system, and as a result rapidly 
undermining the resilience of the planet and the future of humanity. The pressures of ecosystem decline, 
pollution and resource depletion have become immense, drawing down on the economic prospects of present 
and future generations.”). 
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any traditional commodity.28 As a result of concretizing this value and creating a 
market for these services, even the most hardened business thinker may find that 
conservation of at least portions of her land survives a cost-benefit analysis. The 
PES concept, which was developed first in other countries29 but has gradually 
cropped up throughout the United States, has begun to have a meaningful impact 
on agricultural land in areas where such programs are being implemented. 
Ultimately, these PES programs are creating a shift in attitude: rather than seeing 
conservation as a sacrifice, it is seen as an economically rational choice when 
ecosystem services are more valuable than other potential commodities for a 
given plot of land.30 When we take into account the multifunctionality of the 
land—capable of producing both goods and services—we position ourselves 
indeed to maximize its economic value.31 
B. Conservation Easements 
Another way that both governments and private organizations pay to protect 
land is via conservation easements. This is a restriction on the property’s use, 
requiring that it be conserved and not exploited for non-conservation values.32 
Most conservation easements are perpetual, 33 as this is preferable for setting 
aside land that can be relied upon for habitat and other ecosystem values. 
Another factor, one which varies by state law and impacts the reliability of the 
 
28. As this trend has begun to develop, resources have been created to provide guidance for such 
programs, which may also improve uniformity, which is preferable in designing new markets. See, e.g., FOREST 
TRENDS ET AL., PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: GETTING STARTED, A PRIMER 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.unep.org/pdf/PaymentsForEcosystemServices_en.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
Additional guidance and templates can be downloaded at Template Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
Agreements, KATOOMBA GROUP, http://www.katoombagroup.org/regions/international/legal_contracts_care. 
php (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
29. For more background on this development period, see James Salzman, Creating Markets for 
Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 870, 873–74 (2005). 
30. See id. at 888 (encouraging a perspective in which the purchase of ecosystem services is treated the 
same as any other cash crop). 
31. For a wonderful discussion of this concept of multifunctionality of agricultural land, see Ruhl, supra 
note 19 at 431–34. 
32. See NANCY A. MCLAUGHLIN, CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: OUTLINE OF RELEVANT LAWS, AG 
STANDING, AND CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 9–10, 14 (2014), available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/ 
sites/default/files/microsites/attorneys-general/outline_of_relevant_laws_ag_standing_and_cases 
_and_controversies_final.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing federal and state law 
provisions that apply to conservation easements); LITTLE TRAVERSE CONSERVANCY, THE CONSERVATION 
EASEMENT AS A LAND PROTECTION AND FINANCIAL PLANNING TOOL 4–5, available at http://www. 
landtrust.org/ProtectingLand/ConsEaseGuidebook.pdf (indicating that a conservation easement is an agreement 
between a landowner and an entity like a conservancy which will restrict future uses of the land); Frequently 
Asked Questions, LAND TRUST FOR TENN., http://landtrusttn.org/faq.html (last visited July 9, 2014) (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that conservation easements are voluntary agreements between 
landowners, land trusts, government agencies, or other organizations qualified to hold the easement). 
33. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and Beyond, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 673, 
675, 705 (2007). 
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ecological value of a conservation easement, is whether third-party enforcement 
of its terms is permitted.34 If a conservation easement is perpetual, third-party 
enforceable, and on ecologically valuable land, this is arguably the ideal 
combination for maximizing its value.  
Conservation easements are purchased from landowners by non-profit 
organizations as well as all levels of government.35 At the federal level, there are 
several programs specifically designed for purchasing conservation easements in 
certain ecosystem types. These programs include the Healthy Forests Restoration 
Program,36 the Wetlands Reserve Program,37 and the Grassland Reserve 
Program,38 the latter two of which are being absorbed into the more 
comprehensive Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP).39 Also 
included is the Conservation Reserve Program, in which rental payments are 
made on short-term leases of land in order to keep it out of agricultural service.40 
In addition to purchasing conservation easements on agricultural land, the federal 
government also pays farmers directly to engage in better practices.41 
One of the more exciting recent developments in the conservation easement 
context—especially relevant to this Article as it represents a first step in the 
direction here proposed—is the National Conservation Easement Database.42 By 
tracking as many conservation easements as possible and mapping them via a 
single GIS, we not only increase the likelihood of enforcement,43 but also open 
 
34. See generally Jessica E. Jay, Third-Party Enforcement of Conservation Easements, 29 VT. L. REV. 
757 (2005). 
35. See KATIE CHANG, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2010 NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS REPORT: A LOOK 
AT VOLUNTARY LAND CONSERVATION IN AMERICA 5 (Rob Aldrich & Christina Soto eds., 2011), available at 
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trusts/land-trust-census/national-land-trust-census-2010/2010-final-report 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing the acres conserved as of 2010 by state, local, and national 
land trusts); ROB ALDRICH & JAMES WYERMAN, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2005 NATIONAL LAND TRUST 
CENSUS REPORT 12 (Chris Soto & Anne W. Garnett eds., 2006), available at http://www.Northolympic 
landtrust.org/Documents/2005LandTrustCensusReport.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing 
the work of non-profit conservation organizations called land trusts). 
36. Healthy Forests Reserve Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/easements/forests/ (last visited June 18, 
2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
37. Wetlands Reserve Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., http://www. 
nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/easements/wetlands/ (last visited June 18, 2014) (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
38. Grassland Reserve Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., http://www. 
nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/easements/grassland/ (last visited June 18, 2014) (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
39. Agricultural Conservation Easement Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION 
SERV., http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/easements/acep/ (last visited June 18, 
2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
40. Conservation Reserve Program, supra note 9. 
41. See infra Part II.D. 
42. NATIONAL CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE, http://conservationeasement.us/ (last visited May 
21, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
43. See Amy Wilson Morris & Adena R. Rissman, Public Access to Information on Private Land 
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the door to comprehensive ecosystem-scale land management.44 The database is 
populated via self-reporting, however, and is thus incomplete.45 With adequate 
funding to engage in comprehensive data compilation—less dependent on 
landowners taking the time to submit it themselves—this database could provide 
a truly comprehensive understanding of the impact of conservation easements on 
any given region or ecosystem.46 
C. Regional Habitat Conservation Plans via the Endangered Species Act 
Another trend in agricultural land conservation is taking place in the context 
of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The ESA does not have statutory 
exemptions for agriculture in the way that other environmental statutes do, 
though in recent years we have seen the emergence of regulatory deals exempting 
agricultural operations from the prohibition against taking certain listed species 
so long as they are engaging in some basic conservation practices (that may or 
may not aid that species).47 While such arrangements may prove problematic for 
conservation,48 the clearly valuable trend is the regional habitat conservation plan 
(RHCP), in which multiple covered parties (for our purposes, this might be 
multiple farmers in a given region) must contribute to a mitigation plan in 
exchange for a limited ability to “take” listed species on their land.49 This ideally 
results in conservation of large and interconnected areas of highly desirable 
habitat at a scale that cannot be achieved via the traditional individual habitat 
conservation plan (HCP).50 It can also reduce administrative costs and improve 
implementation as a result of taking the process out of the hands of the individual 
landowner.51 Unlike the other methods described in this section, the RHCP does 
 
Conservation: Tracking Conservation Easements, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1246 (2009) (indicating that 
enforcement of conservation easement restrictions is difficult without accessible conservation easement data). 
44. See infra Part IV (explaining the need for a compilation of the data from various programs prior to 
embarking on large-scale conservation efforts). 
45. NATIONAL CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE, supra note 42. 
46. And, of course, if you included the data on each of the other conservation programs the picture would 
be crystal clear. 
47. See Robbins, supra note 4. 
48. See id. 
49. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (providing for the use of habitat conservation plans in obtaining an 
incidental take permit); J. B. Ruhl, Regional Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species 
Act: Pushing the Legal and Practical Limits of Species Protection, 44 SW. L.J. 1393 (1991) [hereinafter 
Regional Habitat Conservation] (describing the use of regional habitat conservations plans). 
50. See Regional Habitat Conservation, supra note 49, at 1403–04 (contrasting individual and regional 
habitat conservation plans); George Frampton, Ecosystem Management in the Clinton Administration, 7 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 40 (1996) (describing the transformation of the ESA from “emergency room” to “a 
comprehensive vehicle for regional multi-species habitat planning”); Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation 
Plans: Frayed Safety Nets or Creative Partnerships?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 94, 99 (2001). 
51. See J.B. Ruhl, Harmonizing Distributed Energy and the Endangered Species Act, 4 SAN DIEGO J. 
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 121, 135–37 (2012); J.B. Ruhl, Harmonizing Commercial Wind Power and the 
Endangered Species Act Through Administrative Reform, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1783–85 (2012). 
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not require monetary payment to the landowners, as they are compensated with 
the limited right to incidental take federally listed species.52 It will be important, 
as such permits proliferate, to improve on public participation in the planning, as 
well as increase adaptive planning.53 
D. Federal Subsidies for Best Practices 
Finally, at least for this list of most common approaches, is the practice of 
providing subsidies to farmers and agribusinesses for engaging in more 
environmentally conservative methods of production. Examples of such subsidy 
programs include the Conservation Stewardship Program,54 the Environmental 
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP),55 the related EQIP Organic Initiative,56  and 
the various “conservation partnership programs” (state-private funded grants for 
conservation and restoration efforts).57 Although there is evidence that subsidy-
linked conservation requirements are making a difference,58 their value is 
somewhat limited by the extensive Farm Bill subsidies that actually (albeit as an 
unintended consequence) encourage harmful practices.59 Another concern with 
subsidies for environmental stewardship is that it fails to force polluters to 
internalize their environmental externalities.60 Of course, the only way to do so is 
with command-and-control regulation, which has proven too challenging to 
achieve. For this reason, the remainder of this Article continues the effort to work 
with what has evolved to make it better. 
 
52. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B)–(2)(A) (2012). 
53. Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management, 
55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 314, 355–56 (2007). 
54. See Conservation Stewardship Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/csp/ (last visited June 23, 2014) (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
55. See Environmental Quality Incentives Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION 
SERV., http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/eqip/ (last visited June 23, 
2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
56. See 2014 EQIP Organic Initiative, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/programs/?cid=nrcs143_008224 (last visited June 23, 
2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
57. See, e.g., Regional Conservation Partnership Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES. 
CONSERVATION SERV., http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/farmbill/rcpp/ (last 
visited June 23, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Conservation Partners Program, NAT’L FISH 
& WILDLIFE FOUND., http://www.nfwf.org/conservationpartners/Pages/home.aspx#.U6id57G9Z8E (last visited 
June 23, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); New York State Conservation Partnership Program, 
NY.GOV, http://www.dec.ny.gov/lands/48901.html (last visited June 23, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review); 
58. See Erin Morrow, Agri-Environmentalism: A Farm Bill for 2007,  38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 345, 360–
61 (2006). 
59. Id. at 371. 
60. See Margaret Rosso Grossman, Agriculture and the Polluter Pays Principle: An Introduction, 59 
OKLA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006). 
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III. INTEGRATED MULTIMODAL GOVERNANCE: THE SWEET SPOT FOR 
AGRICULTURE 
Imagine a large city with several modes of transportation: a subway system, 
buses, and a tourist trolley. This multimodality allows the city to achieve various 
goals that may not all be possible with a single modality alone. It can move 
people quickly (without excess stopping and slow-downs) between residential 
areas and downtown via the subway system. It can get people to a wider range of 
less common destinations, especially for workers in more spread-out 
establishments such as fast-food chains, via the bus system. It can take tourists to 
a network of historic, entertaining, or otherwise appealing locations in eye-
catching trolleys. Now imagine that instead of creating a single transportation 
agency to plan these systems, the city created three separate agencies and did not 
ask them to work together. Indeed, each agency is under the impression that it 
must accomplish all possible goals—meeting all the needs of the metropolis—on 
its own. No coordination of track lines or station locations is allowed either. I 
need not describe the redundancy, gaps, conflicts, and inefficiencies that might 
result, as I am sure you can think of many. To avoid such redundancy and target 
efforts where they are most needed, the city will ideally opt to integrate the 
operation of this multimodal transportation system.61 Some goals will be better 
achieved via one or the other system and a single perspective will allow for such 
targeting. 
Land management, especially for the purposes of ecosystem resilience and 
maximization of ecosystem services, is heavily scale-dependent. While it is not 
entirely inconsequential for a small player to make good stewardship choices on 
his or her parcel at random,62 it is far preferable (and, frankly, essential) to 
manage conservation practices at the landscape scale.63 We have seen our greatest 
ecosystem management successes when vast land areas have been managed in a 
unified manner in spite of the numerous and varied stakeholders involved.64 
Ecosystems thrive when we prioritize both size and connectivity of protected 
 
61. See EDWARD WEINER, URBAN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES: AN 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW (1999) (recognizing the need for centralized urban transportation planning, but 
lamenting that some cities have chosen a path of decentralization of authority instead). 
62. Of course, as with other environmentally conservative behaviors (e.g., recycling or use of low-
emissions vehicles), this will have greater value when a greater percentage of people do so. 
63. See Laven et al., supra note 17, at 5 (describing the importance of using a landscape-scale approach 
to conservation). 
64. Judith A. Layzer, Ecosystem-Based Management: An Empirical Assessment, in THE LAWS OF 
NATURE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT LAW AND POLICY Ch. 2 (University 
of Akron Press, Kalyani Robbins ed., 2013). See also, e.g., GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM, 
YELLOWSTONE RESOURCES AND ISSUES HANDBOOK (2013), available at http://www.nps.gov/yell/planyour 
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areas.
65
 This is why integrated multimodal governance is the best feasible system 
for ecosystem conservation on agricultural lands. 
Of course, the first question is why multimodal at all? If a centralized 
perspective is so valuable to ecosystem management, why not regulate the 
balance between agricultural use and habitat conservation with a single mode of 
governance? This might make sense as a completely abstract concept applied to a 
hypothetical newly-created state, but U.S. history, culture, economics, and 
politics have already firmly developed the value of independence for farmers and 
big-ag alike (albeit for different reasons, with the former relying more on the 
history/culture aspects and the latter more on the economics/politics).66 As 
mentioned at the outset, this problem is intractable, and no effort is made in this 
Article to solve it. Instead, the goal here is to take what we have—multimodal 
governance that has sprung up from many varied sources—and work with it by 
proposing an approach that might maximize value both to the environment and to 
farmers via an overseeing entity. Integrated multimodal governance, while not a 
panacea nor appropriate for all contexts, is the best possible approach to the 
particular context of conservation on agricultural land. 
Tony Arnold first identified integrationist multimodality as an emerging 
approach to environmental law in his 2011 article, Fourth-Generation 
Environmental Law: Integrationist and Multimodal.67 He made clear, however, 
that he did not intend his work to be normative but rather sought to identify this 
emergence, for better or worse.68 Indeed, some contexts will benefit more than 
others from such an approach, and in some cases it may be entirely 
inappropriate.69 This Article, conversely, does express a normative perspective, 
applied to the narrow context of ecosystem management in highly agricultural 
regions. “Multimodality is a much broader phenomenon that appears in complex 
evolutionary systems and in human efforts to interact with complex problems or 
tasks by using multiple methods.”70 Integrated multimodality is thus a process of 
coordinating these multiple methods. 
The many programs discussed in Part II of this Article are noble efforts to 
contribute substantial resources to getting farmers to implement conservation 
approaches to their agricultural operations or to set aside some of their land from 
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cultivation entirely. However, these programs respond to participant applications 
individually, which results in a somewhat scattershot impact on the landscape. 
Moreover, they operate separately from one another, which adds yet another 
layer of blindness to the particular ecosystem needs. To maximize the value of 
the many dollars spent on these programs, it is necessary to manage the 
landscape holistically at a scale that reflects the functioning of the ecosystems 
upon it.71 When we look at the multifunctionality of a given parcel of land, 72 and 
attempt to compare the value of goods production with that of services (in order 
to make the best use of that land), we need to know what value that land has to 
the ecosystem of which it is a part. This requires a more comprehensive 
viewpoint, especially when we consider that this value will depend in part on 
what other farmers are doing with their land. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
The integration of our multiple modes of implementing ecosystem 
conservation on agricultural lands does not necessarily require a single 
programmatic entity, which is likely unattainable in this context. It will, however, 
require substantial coordination of the myriad programs as well as perhaps some 
additional gap-filling proposals. Connections must be developed among actors, 
ecosystem needs at the relevant scales, and methodology being implemented 
throughout the relevant geographic area.73 The value of connecting the dots and 
integrating the management of these programs is substantial,74 but in light of the 
intensity of farmer and big-ag independence, the real question is how to achieve 
it. 
While it is likely impossible to impose mandatory participation in these 
programs, which farmers would interpret as an assault on the sense of autonomy 
that they enjoy and expect,75 it is possible to provide guidance and connections 
among all actors (whether agricultural or conservation program administrators) 
via a single entity capable of seeing the big picture. This single entity to 
holistically oversee agricultural land conservation would compile and overlay the 
data from all existing programs, both public and private.76 Instead of haphazard 
individual-farmer-initiated implementation, this entity would provide on-the-
ground guidance to landowners regarding preferred uses for their lands, with an 
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eye toward habitat and ecosystem-service needs as well as commodity demand. 
In other words, the interdisciplinary team making up this entity would be looking 
to maximize at least two values, goods and services, and potentially a third, 
ecosystem health independent of service provision, for the sake of the future. 
In addition to providing oversight for the combined efforts of all programs 
and seeking to balance these efforts based on areas of greater need via 
individualized guidance to farmers, this entity would also operate as a think tank, 
generating gap-filling policy proposals based on this comprehensive viewpoint. It 
would operate at the watershed scale with regional offices. While decision-
making guidance regarding geographic placement of conservation land would 
take place on this regional or watershed scale, at a national level the entity would 
disseminate, to the extent appropriate, valuable innovations and information. 
This, of course, would also be the scale of any broader policy guidance. 
This new entity could be a federal agency with watershed-based field offices. 
The upside to this would be reliable funding (once appropriated) and greater 
accountability. Alternatively, it could be a private organization, presumably with 
not-for-profit status. While this creates the need for adequate charitable interest 
to bring funding, if feasible it could help to avoid some of the drawbacks to the 
government approach. The most notable such drawback is the risk of agency 
capture by special interests (of course, this risk is lessened by the guidance-level 
authority of the agency, but its influence could still be great enough to attract 
such efforts), but there is also the problem of distrust of government, which is 
widespread in the agricultural community. A private non-profit seeking to 
maximize both agricultural success and ecological values may be more palatable 
to landowners. It would be a source of free expert guidance through the thicket of 
federal, state, and private programs available to the farmer, resulting in greater 
feelings of trust. 
Whether public or private, the primary goal of this organization or agency 
would be to maximize efficient use of the land resource, thereby improving both 
economic and ecological value. Each parcel (or portion of a parcel) of land has a 
different best use based on comparing its ecological value (taking into account its 
potential impact on ecosystem services) with its commodity production value.77 
Individual farmers are unlikely to know how to maximize the value of their land 
without expert guidance. That guidance, in turn, depends upon access to 
ecosystem-wide information—information that administrators of individual 
programs a farmer chooses to contact may not have. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When systems develop in a piecemeal fashion with many different 
participants, oftentimes the result is less than optimal. At some point in time it 
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becomes necessary to take stock of what we have and consider what is working 
well (such as paying for the ecological benefits we seek from farmers) and what 
is not (such as the failure to maximize the value of each parcel of land in relation 
to the uses occurring on neighboring parcels). Typically the value of a 
comprehensive strategy is attained via centralized regulation of a field, but in 
complex and politically fraught areas such as conservation on agricultural land, 
this is not feasible. Given that the multimodal approach appears unavoidable, 
value must be maximized more creatively. The proposal in this Article is a broad-
strokes effort to simply begin the discussion of what can be done to bring 
together the implementation of otherwise unconnected programs. Without doing 
so, waste will continue and potentially worsen. When we work with complete 
information regarding the most valuable use of each increment of our resources, 
waste can be minimized, and this is an area in which we could certainly use a 
bigger pie. 
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